An access review where every manager clicks approve is worse than no review, because it manufactures evidence that access was checked. This template is built to produce the two things auditors actually test: a named reviewer who attested, and proof that the revocations they asked for happened.
MFA rollouts stall at about 90% coverage, and the remaining 10% is where the risk concentrates: shared accounts, service accounts, field staff without smartphones, and executives who asked for an exemption.
Joiners and leavers get attention because they are visible events. Movers do not, which is why permission creep is almost entirely a mover problem: people accumulate access from every role they have held.
Role templates are the single most effective control against permission creep, because they replace 'give them what Priya has' with a defined standard. The matrix is also what makes access reviews possible. You need a baseline to compare against.
Service accounts outlive the people who created them, hold standing privilege, and are excluded from the access reviews that cover humans. An account with no named owner and a password set four years ago is the one attackers look for.